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Abstract 
The Navy is developing a replacement system, designated as the P-8 
Poseidon, for the aging P-3C Orion fleet of aircraft, expanding the mission profile to 
meet the requirements for its Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA).  The 
Incremental acquisition approach leverages the Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) 
concept, using a modified Boeing 737 aircraft system.  The concept integrates the 
COTS components with Government-Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) elements, including 
offensive and defensive systems, mission packages, and Operational Flight Profiles 
(OFP), as well as some newly developed systems.  The COTS, GOTS, and newly 
developed systems are all software-intensive and drive the need for an effective 
software support architecture that necessarily combines commercial and 
Governmental entities.  This research analyzes potential system software 
maintenance drivers, and presents advantages and disadvantages for three differing 
software support management options.  The conclusions reached lead the 
researchers to recommend that an organic (Navy) software support management 
structure would be most advantageous.  
Keywords: Intelligence, Surveillance, &Reconnaissance (ISR); Anti-
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I. Introduction:  Background 
A. P-8A Poseidon System Overview/Introduction 
Aging aircraft and the associated challenges of supporting older weapon 
systems continue to plague the Department of Defense with obsolescence issues 
and increased maintenance costs. There are several acquisition programs underway 
to replace the aging aircraft fleets—for example, the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) and 
procuring additional F/A-18’s. Another initiative to replace an aging fleet is the next-
generation Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance (MPR) weapon system: the P-8 
Multi-mission Maritime Aircraft (MMA). The United States Navy is replacing the P-3C 
Orion, which has been in the inventory for 26 years,1 with a commercial-derivative 
Boeing 737-800 aircraft.  
The system consists of inter-related segments: the Air Vehicle (everything 
that goes airborne in and on the aircraft) and P-8A MMA product support (including 
P-8A MMA unique facilities, personnel, training, and support equipment). In other 
words, this system includes the Air Vehicle and all associated equipment, related 
unique facilities, materials, software, services, training, manufacturing, disposal, 
deployment, and support required to ensure that the P-8A MMA System can 
accomplish its intended operational role.  The Tactical Support Center (TSC), while 
a unique support facility for MPR, is not included in the P-8A MMA System.  The P-
8A MMA System is required to operate effectively in the context of its external 
system interfaces and environments (DoN, n.d.).   
The P-8A Poseidon will maintain the latest capabilities of the P-3C Orion Anti-
Surface Warfare (ASuW) Improvement Program (AIP)—including the Anti-
Submarine Warfare Acoustic Display and Control System upgrade (AN/USQ-78 (V)), 
the Block Modification Upgrade (BMUP), as well as a state-of-the-art flight station 
and navigation/communication system. Additionally, the P-8A will incorporate in-
                                            
1 Navy officials said the average age of the 196 aircraft still in the inventory is 26 years (CNN, 2004).  
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flight refueling capabilities, yielding extended ranges and time-on-station previously 
unavailable in the P-3C fleet (DoN, 2007, March). 
For the acquisition strategy, the Navy decided to pursue a Commercial-Off-
the-Shelf (COTS) solution to leverage support of the system off the globally 
deployed aircraft in the commercial sector and to reduce risk across the program.  
This approach is in line with the most recent Department of Defense acquisition 
guidance: “To achieve the best possible system solution, emphasis shall be placed 
on innovation and competition. Existing commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) 
functionality and solution drawn from a diversified range of large and small business 
shall be considered” (DoD, 2008, December 8). 
By using the COTS philosophy, Navy leaders are ensuring there will be 
minimal development costs for the airframe and associated systems.  The aircraft 
airframe has limited design changes, and the parts will be interchangeable with 
commercial fleets and available from Boeing 737 (B-737) service centers throughout 
the world. The supportability issues will likely not come from the hardware on the P-
8; the challenge will be in the software sustainment and software upgrades for the 
on-board systems supporting a weapon system scheduled to be in the Navy 
inventory for 20+ years (CNN, 2004). 
The P-8A program was initially an evolutionary acquisition program using 
spiral development to align the requirements with the acquisition strategy.  The 
acquisition strategy has now been changed to an Incremental Acquisition 
approach—utilizing enhanced system development to provide mature capability to 
the Warfighter.  
The acquisition strategy details a method that partners commercial industry 
and the P-8 fleet, with a goal of delivering the first increment of aircraft to the users 
in the quickest, most cost efficient manner. During this first increment (the 
Development Phase), the program will pursue improvement in system capabilities 
through an incremental development process to keep pace with emerging threats, 
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technologies and strategic requirements of the Navy and Joint Forces (DoN, 2007, 
March). 
B. Acquisition Strategy  
Based on the applicable acquisition regulations at the time, the P-8A program 
used an Evolutionary Acquisition approach (using a spiral development technique) to 
align the processes employed for requirements definition, acquisition strategy, and 
system development into a flexible program to meet the strategic vision of the Navy.  
 Evolutionary Acquisition is defined as: 
the preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology for the 
user. An evolutionary approach delivers capability in increments, recognizing, 
up front, the need for future capability improvements. The object is to balance 
the needs and available capability with resources, and to put capability into 
the hands of the user quickly. The success of the strategy depends on 
consistent and continuous definition of requirements, and the maturation of 
technologies that lead to disciplined development and production of systems 
that provide increasing capability towards a materiel concept. (DoD, 2003, 
May 12)  
The Evolutionary Acquisition approach has been abandoned by the DoD. In 
fact, the May 2009 version of the Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 (DoDI 
5000.02) dropped the Evolutionary Acquisition approach and the Spiral 
Development technique. Now, the P-8 MMA Program Office is instead restructuring 
the program into an Incremental Acquisition approach.  The primary difference 
between the Evolutionary and the Incremental approaches is that the increments 
within the Incremental approach are much more defined than each typical spiral in 
the Evolutionary approach.  The intent of the well-defined increments is to provide 
more predictable schedules and budgets, causing less friction with Congress and 
high-level decision-makers.  While the approach changes, the overall strategy 
remains the same. 
The plan for the MMA develops a strategy that provides a partnership 
between the B-737 commercial industry and the Navy P-8 fleet. The strategy also 
focuses on delivering the aircraft to the users in the quickest, most cost-efficient 
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manner. At the same time, the program will pursue improvements in system 
capabilities through spiral development—permitting the system to keep pace with 
new technologies, emerging threats and requirements of the Navy and Joint Forces 
(DoN, 2007, March). 
The Navy initially selected spiral development based on acquisition policy at 
program initiation (DoD, 2003, May 12).  The revised Operation of the Defense 
Acquisition System (DoD, 2008, December 8) DoD Instruction has deleted spiral 
development as an evolutionary acquisition approach, identifying only Incremental 
as a means of achieving rapid acquisition of mature technology. In fact, the revised 
instruction has established a Configuration Steering Board (CSB).  The DoD 
mandates:  
The Acquisition Executive of each DoD Component shall establish and chair 
a CSB with broad executive membership including senior representatives 
from the Office of the USD(AT&L) [Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology, and Logistics] and the Joint Staff. Additional executive members 
shall include representatives from the office of the chief of staff of the Armed 
Force concerned, and other Armed Forces representatives where 
appropriate, the military deputy to the CAE and the Program Executive Officer 
(PEO). (DoD, 2008, December 8) 
This board was created by the DoD in an attempt to minimize requirements “creep” 
and the spiraling costs of new weapon systems acquisition. 
The CSB shall meet at least annually to review all requirements changes and 
any significant technical configuration changes for ACAT I and ACAT 1A 
programs in development that have the potential to result in cost and 
schedule impacts to the program. Such changes will generally be rejected, 
deferring them to future blocks or increments. Changes shall not be approved 
unless funds are indentified and schedule impacts mitigated. (DoD, 2008, 
December 8) 
C. System Support Structure 
The current P-8 Support Plan implements a process to leverage existing and 
worldwide B-737 commercial support, products, and processes with a cost-effective 
Contractor Logistics Support (CLS) solution for total lifecycle support to the fleet of 
P-8s worldwide.  In addition, the Program Management Office (PMO) will evaluate 
 - 5 - 
and incorporate Performance-based Logistics (PBL) concepts into the P-8A 
maintenance plan to reduce weapon systems cost and improve aircraft readiness 
(DoN, 2007, March). 
The Navy is considering two options for software support: 
 Assign the software configuration items to a Weapons System Support 
Activity (WSSA) to provide software maintenance under a Operation 
and Maintenance, Navy (O&M,N) level of effort [a contractor or 
contractors, in lieu of a Government activity, may be used to provide 
software support where this Software Support Requirements Analysis 
so justifies]; or 
 Not assign the software configuration items to a WSSA, and to treat 
software changes under alternative contracting procedures. (DoN, 
2007, April) 
 
The P-8 acquisition approach combines the use of COTS and Government-
Off-The-Shelf (GOTS) products, including software applications.  Selecting the most 
advantageous software support organizational and management structure depends 
upon properly analyzing the P-8 system software architecture, life cycle plan, and 
support organizations and facilities.  The following sections of this research analyze 
the advantages and disadvantages of differing software maintenance management 
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II. Problem Statement   
This research analyzes the most advantageous software-support organization 
for the P-8 Poseidon ASW Aircraft System, given the known and planned system 
software architecture and support organizational structures.  This analysis will 
address the following research questions: 
a. What are the typical factors affecting software maintainability and 
support organization? 
b. What is the planned P-8 System Software Architecture, and how is that 
architecture likely to impact the maintenance organization concept 
decisions? 
c. What type of software support organizational structure would be most 
advantageous for the P-8 system?
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III. Research Methodology  
A. Analyze Factors Impacting Software Maintainability and 
Software Support Organization 
An initial analysis of the P-8 MMA sub-organizations appears to eliminate the 
possibility of either a purely Organic or purely CLS support organization option.  
Boeing and other participating contractors are extremely unlikely to provide data 
rights or enough access to source code for effective support by a Navy Organic 
software support activity, even if that activity could find, hire, and retain sufficient 
quantities of qualified software engineer “maintainers.”  Conversely, Navy entities 
responsible for the development and maintenance of mission software are unlikely to 
provide highly sensitive or classified software to CLS organizations without severe 
restrictions that would be unattractive to potential CLS contractors.  A hybrid of 
contractor and DoN organic support organizations appears to be the only practical 
approach. 
The leadership and management of the hybrid organization will be analyzed 
under the same three options:  CLS, Organic, or Hybrid management. 
There are numerous factors to be considered in planning for the most 
advantageous support management structure for any system, including the P-8 
system.  This research will address the following factors: 
 Support Concept (including Level of Repair Analysis (LORA)) 
 Software Architectural Complexity  
 Software Design for Maintainability 
 Software Lifecycle Support Plan (including planned upgrades, added 
capabilities, and interoperability with future systems (e.g., net-centric 
warfare systems) 
 Software Size (Software Lines of Code (SLOC)) 
 Software Safety and Security Considerations 
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B. Determine Software Supportability Organization Options 
This research will consider three basic software-support organizational 
structures: 
 Organic. All software maintenance management functions are 
conducted by or under the direct control of the US Government 
(Department of the Navy (DoN)). 
 Contracted Logistics Support (CLS).  All software maintenance 
management functions are conducted by organizations under contract 
with the DoN. 
 Hybrid Organic/CLS Structure.  The system software maintenance 
management support is divided with some management conducted by 
DoN organic organizations and other functions conducted by CLS 
organizations. 
In addition to P-8 operational concerns, several other factors will impact the 
software support organizational concept decisions.  The P-8 aircraft is based on a 
Boeing commercial design (B-737), so decision-makers must consider software data 
rights and issues of proprietary properties.  The P-8 is designed to be a Multi-
mission Aircraft (MMA)—including Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
(ISR) missions that will deal with sensitive and classified data and that will likely 
employ classified software programs.  Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR)and 
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)  will obviously need to scrutinize the flight 
software for safety of flight issues and other Naval operational requirements.  As 
communicating mission data is a primary mission, the PMO must ensure that all 
DoD Information Assurance (IA) requirements, including the DoD Information 
Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DoD, 2007, November), are met 
and maintained.  The dynamic nature of the P-8 MMA software support 
organizations (combined with the DoD and FAA overseeing entities) will likely create 
a challenging environment for the software support management team. 
C. Analyze P-8 Software Architecture 
This research analyzes the planned P-8 software architecture to gain insights 
into the system design for maintainability.  The analysis will include the amount of 
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new software applications, legacy applications, number of different software 
applications, and the need for differing application interoperability.  The planned P-8 
software architecture will provide insight into the relative advantages or 
disadvantages of the organizational alternatives. 
D. Analyze Initially Planned P-8 Software Support 
Organizational Structure 
As part of the initial program documentation, the researchers conducted some 
analysis to establish the fundamental system supportability concept.  The system 
concept will provide a framework and establish parameters and constraints 
impacting software support organization analyses. 
E.  Analyze Analogous DoD Systems 
This research will contrast several DoD systems with similar system software 
architectures to the P-8 for comparative purposes.  Systems researched will include 
the US Air Force B-1 B bomber, the Air Force KC-135, and Air Force One.










THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 - 13 - 
IV. Data and Analysis  
A. System Acquisition Strategy   
The P-8 acquisition strategy was one of Evolutionary Approach using Spiral 
Development techniques.  This strategy was designed to provide the warfighter with 
initial capability as early as possible, with additional functions and capabilities added 
as needed.  With such an approach, there would necessarily be numerous planned 
and unplanned changes that would impact the system software and Post-
deployment Software Support (PDSS)—including significant software development 
as well as sustainment type activities.  The evolutionary approach also indicated that 
the final, objective system configuration was not known; thus, current Software Lines 
of Code (SLOC) estimates and final system software architectural complexity were 
likely to be underestimated.   
With the change of acquisition approach from the Evolutionary to Incremental, 
decision-makers conducted a more detailed analysis in order to more fully define the 
work to be accomplished in each increment.  This approach should provide more 
accurate estimates (of both SLOC and the required software engineering effort) for 
the development of each increment, allowing a better understanding of the objective 
software size and structure.  In turn, the PDSS estimates should be more accurately 
estimable.  The actual P-8 MMA Incremental Approach was not available for this 
research effort.  Without the actual, updated data, the researchers conducted more 
generalized analyses based upon the data provided.  Resulting conclusions and 
recommendations are based on the generalized analysis approach. 
The current Software Support Requirements Analysis does address computer 
source code for either commercial or military unique software developed in support 
of the P-8 program, addresses access to contractor developed source code, and 
includes just one statement regarding obsolescence. Unlike the programs of the 
past, computer resources hardware obsolescence issues are not expected to require 
 - 14 - 
many accompanying software upgrades due to the inclusion of portability layers in 
the architecture. 
How does this “built in” obsolescence affect military weapon systems? With 
software transistor density doubling every two years (Moore’s Law), each Program 
Office must ensure that proposed budgets for its program reflect accurate costs and 
that the budget justification documents clearly articulate the criticality of upgrading 
weapon system software.  The Government Accountability Office (GAO) explains, 
“Unless DOD assesses and secures its right for the use of technical data early in the 
weapon systems acquisition process when it has the great leverage to negotiate, 
DOD may face latter challenges in sustaining weapon systems over their life cycle” 
GAO, 2005, October). 
B. P-8 System Software Architecture   
The system software architecture is based on an open-systems approach 
with designed portability layers supporting the Incremental Acquisition strategy.  The 
starting point for the architecture is the reuse of several Navy-managed, mission-
oriented software applications migrating to the new platform.  These applications will 
be combined with existing weapon systems planned for integration on the P-8, as 
well as the Boeing avionics package developed for the airframe that has been 
modified for the anticipated mission flight envelopes envisioned for the P-8.  This 
initial architecture is designed to leverage existing software applications and focuses 
on adapting those to meet functional mission requirements of the P-8.  The P-8 
systems and programs involve at least four major contractors (Boeing, Raytheon, 
Northrop-Grumman, and Smiths) and their numerous associated subcontractors, as 
well as at least two major Navy-controlled mission systems.  While many of these 
mission applications have no doubt been working together for some time, others will 
be newly integrated into the P-8’s architecture.  The supportability aspects of this 
software architecture are incidental to the system’s design, as at least some of these 
major software components have not been designed to be integrated together.  This 
architectural approach is likely to require the development of software middleware if 
it is to allow dissimilar applications to communicate or share data and resources; 
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however, adding middleware will increase the software supportability burden of the 
P-8 system.  In addition, this type of architecture adds to the difficulty of maintaining 
software because problems or integration challenges often happen between 
applications supported by different organizations—thus increasing the likelihood that 
more software maintainers will be needed to support the system than would be likely 
in an integrated architecture that was designed for supportability and under the 
control of a single entity.  In addition, integration of this entire architecture into a net-
centric warfighting system (such as the Navy’s ForceNet), will add to the system 
software supportability challenges immensely.  The challenge is exacerbated by —
program managers trying to maintain all of the required Information Assurance (IA) 
DIACAP certifications. 
It is not clear, from the documentation provided, how the P-8’s system 
software supportability performance was planned or communicated with the 
contractors or Government software engineering organizations. Performance 
specifications addressing Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interoperability/Interfaces, 
Reliability, Safety & Security (MUIRS) performance attributes (Naegle, 2006) of the 
system software drive the system architecture toward a more supportable, flexible 
design.  The degree to which the MUIRS elements were specified as performance 
attributes in the original contract is unknown, but it is likely they were difficult to 
attain due to the P-8 acquisition approach that includes existing software 
applications and procurement of commercial avionics applications embedded with 
the air platform.  There are several models that correlate the system software 
architecture to expected supportability costs that may apply to the P-8 Program.  Jan 
Bosch and PerOlof Bengtsson (Bosch & Bengtsson, 2001) have developed a 
quantitative model assessing the maintainability aspects (quality attributes) of a 
particular software architecture based on specified, stakeholder-based operational 
scenarios.  This model requires scenario development and recommends the 
Software Engineering Institute (SEI)-developed Architecture Tradeoff Analysis 
Method (ATAM) (Kazman, Klein, & Clements, 2000).  (The ATAM approach is taught 
and recommended in NPS software acquisition courses).  The stakeholder-based 
scenarios resulting from an ATAM analysis would provide great insight to the 
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operational needs for supportability attributes and the planned P-8 software 
architecture design effectiveness in meeting those operational needs.  It is designed 
to be used prior to the software architectural design process to influence the design 
towards supportability performance attributes.  The PMO conducted an ATAM 
evaluation on the P-8 MMA, but results of the analysis were not available for this 
research.  Because the ATAM data was not available, it is unknown whether the 
architectural tradeoffs considered the supportability aspects of the alternative 
designs.  As the P-8 software architecture has been substantially set, the Bosch and 
Bengtsson quantitative approach would be limited to gaining a more accurate 
estimate of software support costs. 
Mr. Julian Gibbs (Gibbs, 2001) created a software support cost model titled A 
Software Support Cost Model for Military Systems. This model focused on military 
systems in the United Kingdom (UK) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
and might provide a simpler approach to estimating supportability costs compared to 
the Bosch and Bengtsson quantitative approach.  Mr. Gibbs created a model by 
researching over 120 software-intensive systems and then selecting 48 of them for 
detailed analysis.  The analysis focused on research statistics that had high 
correlation to the empirical system software supportability cost.  Surprisingly, several 
factors traditionally used in predicting software supportability costs (software size 
(SLOC), number of users, number of sites, etc.) showed low correlation to the costs 
experienced.  The significant factors were the system’s military essentiality, the 
operational environment, the age of the software used, and the type of contract.  All 
of these parameters had a correlation of 0.9 or higher with regard to software 
supportability costs.  Data required for this analysis was not available for this 
research; however, the application of this model appears to require minimal effort 
and might provide additional insight to the probable P-8 software support costs. 
C. P-8 Software Support Architecture   
The P-8 is designed in a two-level maintenance concept with no intermediate 
maintenance support planned between the Organizational level and the Depot level 
(an O-to-D, two-level concept).  While the following is not delineated in the reference 
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documents, the researchers assume that Organizational-level software maintenance 
actions would be limited (immediate action, problem recording, reboot, etc.)—with 
nearly all other software maintenance actions deferred to the Depot level.  The 
controlling organization of those Depot-level support activities is the subject of this 
research and consists of three options: Organic, CLS, or Hybrid Organic-CLS.   
Maintainability, Upgradeability, Interoperability, Reliability, and Safety/Security 
(MUIRS) software support functions will be almost exclusively performed at the 
depot level under this two-level concept.  The P-8 MUIRS software analysis will be 
conducted in four different software testing facilities: The Mission Systems Software 
Development Laboratory (SDL), the Mission Systems Integration Laboratory (MSIL), 
the Weapons Systems Integration Laboratory (WSIL), and the Patuxent River 
System Integration Laboratory (PAXSIL).  The SDL, MSIL, and WSIL are existing 
facilities, and the PAXSIL is a deliverable under the P-8 contract.  The SDL and 
MSIL facilities are used by Navy organic entities to develop, integrate and test the 
mission software applications.  Once complete, the Navy provides the developed 
Operational Flight Programs (OFPs) to the WSIL and PAXSIL for integration testing 
with the armament/ordnance control subsystems, flight deck, flight station avionics, 
and mission system avionics.  Boeing and other primary contractors will have access 
to the WSIL and PAXSIL for testing of system-level integration, specification 
compliance verification, and to support airworthiness certification.  The PAXSIL will 
not support software sustainment development activities, as it is a test-only 
laboratory. 
Any discussions about sustainment, whether hardware or software, must 
address constraints and compliance imposed by Public Law. The Limitations on 
Performance of Depot Level Maintenance legislation (Section 2466, Title 10 USC)—
otherwise known as the “50/50 Rule”—stipulates that not more than 50% of the 
funds made available in a fiscal year to a military department or defense agency for 
depot-level maintenance and repair may be used for work performed by private-
sector contractors.” This “50/50” rule includes software maintenance. This becomes 
one of the drivers in decisions regarding organic versus contractor sustainment; the 
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proper estimation of PDSS costs becomes critical as cost increases can rapidly 
impact the 50/50 distribution of funding. 
While the O-to-D, two-level concept appears to be a streamlined approach to 
P-8 system support, the Depot-level software support structure appears to be very 
cumbersome.  There are not less than five different software-developing entities, 
including four lead contractors and organic Navy developers.  There are four 
planned Software Integration Laboratories (SILs) with final integration and contractor 
access planned for two of the SILs, one of which is designed to be test-only.  
Emerging software problems identified by the WSIL, PAXSIL, or by the operational 
fleet would necessarily be addressed by one or more of at least five differing (and 
possibly competing) organizations for resolution and retesting through one or more 
of the SILs.  Integration or other software problems involving two or more of the 
application developers requires the cooperation of both, which may be complicated 
by issues of contract language, proprietary rights or—in the case of the Navy-
developed applications—security clearance and need-to-know concerns.  
Regression testing of reengineered or patched software components is likely to be 
significant, and in the case of airworthiness or Information Assurance (IA)-related 
actions, regression testing will likely be onerous. 
With the numerous software-developing entities anticipated for the P-8 
software architecture, the personnel support structure is likely to be significantly 
higher than with a similar-sized organization supporting an integrated engineering 
architecture with a unified development staff.  Each of the five organizations will 
have developers, QA personnel, managers, and support personnel operating in at 
least two different environments—one environment designed to handle immediate 
maintenance actions on the fielded version, and a second developing/integrating the 
next upgrade increment planned.  In addition, the manning of four SILs will likely add 
support personnel to the requirement, as will the inclusion of the planned software 
library. 
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The P-8 support architecture is significantly driven by the planned P-8 System 
Software Architecture, which is leveraging existing applications, development 
expertise, organizations, and facilities—including SILs.  This approach is likely to 
significantly reduce the development cost when compared to newly developed, 
wholly engineered, integrated software architecture for the P-8 MMA system.  
However, the software acquisition plan supports the acquisition and was not 
designed for maintainability.  The cost of PDSS is likely to be significant because of 
the resulting support structures, organizations, and personnel.  Each corrective 
action, upgraded capability, new interface, or other software maintenance action has 
the potential to be processed through a labyrinth of structures, organizations, 
laboratories, tests, certifications, and management before being operational on the 
P-8 system. 
As explained above, the contractual structure of the planned P-8 support 
architecture appears to be complex with prime contractors, numerous 
subcontractors, and vendors providing software products and services.  In addition, 
as system integration continues, it is likely that middleware will be required creating 
the probability that additional entities will be needed to support the system.  This 
situation has the potential of creating a confusing array of contracts that must be 
managed by the support organization selected. 
D. Software Size   
Software size, measured in Software Lines of Code (SLOC), is one indicator 
of expected maintainability costs.  The P-8 is currently estimating 2.657 million 
SLOC for the system as initially deployed.  A study conducted by Professors Lientz 
and Swanson from UCLA indicated that, on average, one software maintainer 
maintained approximately 16,500 SLOC per year (Data processing organizations) 
(Lientz & Swanson, 1980).  This is obviously not completely applicable to an 
integrated weapon system such as the P-8 MMA, but may provide a rough indication 
of the order of magnitude and of the level of support that might be expected.  Using 
the Lientz and Swanson model (1980), the P-8 would require 161 full-time software 
maintainers across all applications.  As the vast majority would likely be contractors, 
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a conservative estimate of a burdened annual rate would be about $150,000 per 
maintainer.  The annual cost for 161 maintainers would be approximately $24.15 
million.  As additional spirals of capability would likely be developed, the SLOC count 
would increase, and the cost would increase accordingly.  Given the P-8 software 
architecture envisioned and the associated organizational structures identified 
earlier, there would likely be more software support personnel per 16.5 KSLOC 
rather than less due to the complexity of the system software architecture.  There 
are numerous other predictive models that may give more accurate estimates, but 
they would need to have more detailed parameters and data than were available 
with the documentation provided. 
Surprisingly, the UK research and resulting model (Gibbs, 2001) did not 
include the software size because the research indicated that there was very low 
correlation between the software size and the software supportability costs.  This 
lack of correlation indicates that the size of the software may not be a significant 
driver of support costs, or more likely, that other factors are more dominant in the 
supportability cost-estimation process.  Mr. Gibbs’ research did indicate that the 
mission criticality, software age, complexity, and volatility of the environment 
(planned changes, upgrades, new interoperability requirements, etc.) were 
significant drivers of the supportability costs in defense systems. 
E. P-8 Lifecycle Management   
In 2007, the National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA) listed two of the 
Top Software Issues impacting software sustainment: 
 Software Lifecycle planning and management by acquirers and 
suppliers is ineffective.  
 Inadequate attention is given to total lifecycle issues for COTS/NDI 
impacts on lifecycle costs and risk.  (Baldwin, 2007) 
The documents provided did not detail the P-8 system lifecycle management 
plan, but it is anticipated that the P-8 will have a long life-span, with numerous 
planned and unplanned software updates and upgrades.  Planned 
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updates/upgrades for mission modules, avionics, defensive weapon software, 
ForceNet (or other networks) interoperability, and other major systems likely have 
been scheduled and planned into the P-8 lifecycle.  There will also be numerous 
unplanned update and upgrade requirements for emerging mission software, 
Information Assurance, threat countermeasures, network interoperability, safety of 
flight, and other unforeseen requirements.  By combining the planned and 
unplanned software changes, we can see there will be a continuing need for a 
significant amount of software support throughout the P-8 lifecycle. 
The PMO utilized a systems engineering approach to develop a Support 
Concept that employs logistic support solutions such as centralized contractor 
maintenance, performance-based Supply Chain Management (SCM), reliability-
improvement incentives, and spiral development in order to meet the requirements 
established in the Performance-based Specification (PBS). The PMO has 
implemented or will implement Government-approved commercial processes that 
fulfill the requirements of Supportability Analyses (SA)—such as Failure Modes 
Effects and Criticality Analyses (FMECA), Reverse Logistics Association (RLA), and 
Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)—in the P-8A Maintenance Management 
Plan (MMP). Utilizing legacy and newly developed data, the contractor is required to 
populate and maintain a Supportability database containing the maintenance, 
engineering, and provisioning data necessary to conduct initial maintenance 
planning. Once matured, the P-8 software support group can utilize the 
Supportability database to update the Support Concept as necessary to meet 
Readiness and O&S cost goals. 
Interim Contractor Support (ICS) will be established with The Boeing 
Company CLS services for maintenance, support, and SCM. The Interim Support 
period will bridge the gap between System Development and Demonstration (SDD) 
and Navy Support Date (NSD)—defined as Initial Operational Capability (IOC) plus 
two years. The Interim Support contract, or bridge contract, will provide for the 
establishment of the initial P-8A Main Operating Bases (MOBs) and Primary 
Deployment Sites (PDSs). The interim support period not only provides support for 
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initial aircraft, but also system and support data required to facilitate the competition 
and implementation of the eventual long-term support PBL contract. The Interim 
Support period will provide a risk-mitigation period, in which NAVAIR will further 
evaluate the support system’s performance and capability (DoD, 2007, March). 
F. P-8 PDSS Support Management   
With the existing software applications, organizations, and facilities, it is 
unlikely that the development and initial maintainability could be performed by Navy 
Organic organizations or by a purely CLS contract.  The proprietary software 
associated with the aircraft and other subsystems would be too costly to acquire, if 
available at all.  The classified and sensitive nature of some mission modules 
severely complicates the use of contractors for maintenance.  There will most 
probably be a Navy official who is charged with the PDSS responsibilities, but the 
organization that performs the management may be one of three options.  Options 
and advantages/disadvantages for the overall management of the PDSS effort are 
discussed below. 
1. Organic Management 
 Advantages 
o Organic Management provides unity of the software support 
function. 
o It facilitates positive control under Navy leadership. 
o It is likely to be the most cost-effective approach after procuring 
access to contractor software. 
o It focuses on improving system reliability and availability. 
 Disadvantages 
o Organic Management could be very costly and difficult to gain 
access to all contractor software code, future updates/upgrades, 
and access to contractor testing/SILs, requiring skillful contract 
negotiations. 
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o It requires the establishment of a robust Navy organic 
management team. 
o It requires leaders to attract and retain qualified software 
professionals for needed support activities. 
o It requires leaders to gain and maintain software licensing 
agreements, which may be challenging. 
2. CLS Management 
 Advantages 
o CLS Management provides unity of the software support 
function. 
o The size of the effort in terms of funding levels is likely to 
incentivize the contractor competition for CLS contract. 
o CLS is likely to provide the highest degree of flexibility as the 
contractor is able to expand or contract more rapidly than the 
Government workforce.  
o It maintains the ability to access contractor updates/upgrades 
without separate contract actions.  
 Disadvantages 
o CLS contract must be carefully crafted to ensure that the 
contractor’s motivation (money) is linked with the Navy’s 
supportability goals (Reliability, Availability, Flexibility, 
Upgradability, Cost-effectiveness, etc.). 
o Navy’s needs outside of the scope of the contract are likely to 
be very expensive (Unilateral Change Orders). 
o CLS contract control over Navy-produced mission software and 
Navy-organic support personnel, SILs, and other facilities are 
likely to be difficult, especially if shared with other, non-P-8 
program entities. 
o The focus on profitability may detract from system reliability and 
availability unless the contractor is carefully incentivized by the 
contract. 
3. Hybrid Management 
 Advantages 
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o Hybrid Management maintains the chains of Authority for Navy-
organic and Contractor-proprietary software products, 
personnel, and facilities is maintained. 
o It provides the ability to access contractor updates/upgrades. 
o It enhances flexibility by providing access to contractors via 
support-contract agreements. 
 Disadvantages 
o Unity of effort is lost with a hybrid approach. 
o The hybrid organization is likely to have numerous supportability 
contracts with participating contractors and vendors. 
o Financial management is likely to be difficult with numerous 
organic and contract funding streams. 
o It is difficult to manage conflicts between the various support 
entities. 
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V. Other US Defense Systems Software 
Supportability Costs  
An analysis of the P-3C Orion system software supportability costs is 
warranted because the P-8A Poseidon directly replaces the overage P-3 fleet; 
indeed, most P-3 missions will be migrated to the P-8.  Unfortunately, the P-3 
system software supportability costs were not available for this research. 
A. US Air Force B-1 B Bomber   
The B-1 multi-mission system software architecture is very similar to that of 
the P-8.  The B-1 software architecture, similar to the P-8’s, consists of  multiple 
applications consisting of both common military procured and uniquely developed 
software, supported by three www.opm.gov/e-qip/ organizations.  There are 
numerous software vendors and entities arranged in a hybrid support organization 
and coordinated by an Air Force support Program Management Office (PMO).  The 
B-1 PMO budgets approximately $100 million annually for software sustainment—
including software repairs, updates, upgrades, new functionality, interoperability, and 
safety/security/Information Assurance compliance.  At a time when the Air Force is 
accomplishing major software upgrades to the system, the budget is $227 million for 
2010.  (R. Owens, personal communication, May 14, 2009 and Terri Wells, Feb 2, 
2010). 
B. US Air Force KC-135 Aerial Refueling Tanker   
The KC-135 system software is not comparable to the P-8’s because it is an 
older system with one primary mission.  The KC-135’s software consists of 
approximately 2.6 million software lines of code (KSLOC) and budgets 
approximately $12 million annually for software support.  The KC-135 supportability 
is managed through an organic Air Force PMO and includes contracted software-
support arrangements.  In planning for necessary software updates, the 2010 
through 2014 budgets are rapidly expanding to approximately $140 million annually 
(E. Guttery, personal communication, June 18, 2009). 
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C. Air Force One   
Air Force One has approximately 5.75 million SLOC arranged in an 
architecture that is not similar to that of the P-8.  Air Force One is supported through 
a CLS contract with Boeing Corporation.  The annual software support budget for Air 
Force One is approximately $5 million.  Planned software upgrades will accelerate 
the annual software support budget to approximately $25 million for a fleet of two 
aircraft (E. Guttery, personal communication, June 18, 2009). 
By examining other US aircraft software-supportability costs, it is clear that 
complex software architectures can be very expensive to support (as demonstrated 
by the B1 B bomber above).  With the information provided by all three of the 
systems, we can see that the costs to upgrade software can rapidly inflate the need 
for software supportability funding in fielded systems. 
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VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
A. Conclusions   
 This research clearly indicates that a hybrid Organic/CLS software-
support structure provides the most advantageous, and possibly the 
only practicable support-organization concept.  Proprietary software 
associated with the commercially based aircraft would be extremely 
expensive to procure, if available at all—virtually eliminating an all-
Organic support organization.  Classified and sensitive Navy-controlled 
data and software programs (combined with planned use of legacy 
programs currently supported by organic support elements) make it 
impractical, overly costly, or impossible to contract out all software 
maintenance in a wholly CLS support concept. 
 There does appear to be an opportunity to opt for differing 
methodologies for managing the software supportability effort.  Each of 
the three options has advantages and disadvantages that may 
influence the decision, and the recommendation provided by this 
research was based on the degree of control and the likely cost of 
managing the effort. 
 The software supportability cost control will be challenging.  The 
mission-critical nature of the P-8, the complex structure, software size, 
and the anticipated number of significant upgrades, changed/added 
missions, Information Assurance/countering of new threats, and 
eventual networking of the system into the Navy’s ForceNet or other 
DoD net-centric warfighting structures, indicates that there will be the 
need for significant software updates and upgrades in the future.  As 
illustrated by the KC-135 and Air Force One programs, software 
upgrades can often rapidly accelerate the need for supportability 
funding. 
B. Recommendations   
While it is clear that the P-8 software support organization must certainly be a 
hybrid of Navy and contractor entities, the Organic (Navy) support management 
option appears to provide the Navy with the highest degree of control in terms of 
both support services and cost and, thus, is the recommended approach. 
It is highly recommended that the contractor and Navy decision-makers 
negotiate the access to all software for supportability purposes prior to any 
 - 28 - 
contracting actions in order to provide the Navy with the maximum leverage possible 
in gaining supportability access at the most economical cost. 
With the Evolutionary acquisition approach using spiral development 
processes losing DoD and Congressional support, a reassessment of the P-8 
program into a well-defined incremental approach seems warranted.  If possible, 
such a re-evaluation may provide an opportunity for decision-makers to more 
precisely estimate the P-8 system supportability costs for future budget 
considerations.  In addition, there may be an opportunity for some system software 
reengineering toward a more supportable software architecture, reducing the costs 
of future upgrades. 
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